
Prefer a shorter account? Read Ayodhya explained simply. This detailed article includes the people, organisations, court cases and supporting sources.
A mosque stood at this place in Ayodhya. Its name was Babri Masjid.
In 1949, people secretly put Ram idols inside it. Muslims were then stopped from praying there.
In 1992, a mob destroyed the mosque.
In 2019, the Supreme Court recognised that Muslims had been unlawfully driven out and their mosque unlawfully demolished. Yet it awarded the entire disputed site for a Ram temple—the very outcome the temple campaign had demanded. It ordered five acres elsewhere for a mosque.
This article examines a pattern of judicial failure. People unlawfully placed idols inside the mosque in 1949. Temporary orders protected the idols and their worship. Later rulings widened Hindu access and accepted a separate case in Ram Lalla’s name. In 2019, the Court condemned the exclusion and demolition but awarded the entire site for a Ram temple. The question running through this history is how legal procedures preserved the consequences of an unlawful takeover instead of undoing them.
Supreme Court judgment, especially paragraphs 511 and 795–803
1855–1859: two groups used different parts of the site

The story begins in 1855 at Hanumangarhi, a Hindu temple complex near Babri Masjid. A dispute there led to fighting that spread to the mosque.
In 1855, a Muslim religious leader named Shah Ghulam Hussein and his followers claimed that the Hindu ascetics who controlled Hanumangarhi had destroyed a mosque within the temple complex. Violent clashes followed. According to Valay Singh’s account, some witnesses said they had seen or prayed in the mosque. A separate inquiry led by two Muslim clerics supported its existence. But the three-member official commission rejected the claim. Captain Alexander Orr, its British member, disputed the testimony and said witnesses could not reliably identify the mosque’s location. Witnesses and the two inquiries disagreed. The official commission rejected the mosque claim; the other inquiry supported it. Its rejection did not erase the competing testimony. Account of the witnesses and competing inquiries.
The fighting also reached Babri Masjid. After their attack on Hanumangarhi failed, Hussein’s followers retreated into the mosque, where Hindu fighters attacked them. Account of the fighting.
Later, British officials erected a railing at the Babri site to separate the worship areas and reduce further conflict. Muslims prayed inside the mosque. After the railing was erected, Hindus built a raised platform called Ram Chabutra just outside it, where they worshipped Ram. The mosque’s trustee, Mohd Asghar, later argued that the platform had been built in 1857 without permission.
The railing separated the worship areas. It did not decide who owned the land.
In 1858, a Nihang Sikh entered the mosque and carried out worship. A mosque official complained. Officials ordered his removal.
Historical account of the 1855 inquiry Judgment, paragraphs 46 and 683
1885: a request to build outside the mosque
In 1885, Mahant Raghubar Das sought permission to build a temple over Ram Chabutra. The platform was outside the mosque building, within the surrounding grounds.
Raghubar Das was asking to build over the platform outside the mosque. The mosque’s Muslim trustee was initially left out of the case: only the Secretary of State was named as defendant. Mohd Asghar had to apply to join before he could defend the mosque’s interests. He was then admitted as a party. Judgment, paragraph 432.
The British courts refused permission, saying that building a temple so close to the mosque could provoke further conflict. His appeals also failed.
The 1885 case had asked only for permission to build a temple over Ram Chabutra, outside the mosque. Later cases claimed ownership of the disputed site itself. The Supreme Court treated these as different claims, so the earlier refusal did not stop the later cases from proceeding.
Judgment, paragraphs 46 and 430–446
1934: a mob damaged the mosque
During communal riots in March 1934, a Hindu mob damaged Babri Masjid, including its domes.
The British administration arranged repairs through a Muslim contractor. It imposed a collective fine on the Bairagis—Hindu ascetics—and Hindu residents of Ayodhya to recover the repair costs. This made the named communities pay for the repairs collectively.
Muslims continued to use the mosque after the repairs. The damage did not end its use as a mosque.
Supreme Court judgment, paragraphs 47, 699–700 and 788
Before December 1949: a priest slept inside the mosque
Bhaskar Das, then a priest at Ram Chabutra, later recalled sleeping inside Babri Masjid at night and during the afternoon. At the muezzin’s request, he moved his belongings during namaz so Muslims could pray. His recollection shows an everyday relationship of trust and cooperation between a Hindu priest and a Muslim mosque attendant. People could practise their own religion while making room for their neighbours’ faith. His recollection in Ayodhya: The Dark Night.
1949: people secretly put idols inside the mosque
People were told that Ram Lalla—Ram in his child form—had miraculously appeared inside Babri Masjid.
But the idols had been carried there. On the night of 22–23 December 1949, a group entered the mosque and placed them under its central dome.
Ayodhya: The Dark Night describes how a local weekly and pamphlets promoted the miracle story. The miracle story hid the human act: people had put the idols inside a functioning mosque. Read the book excerpt.
Officials had received warnings before it happened. Afterwards, K.K. Nayar, the Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate of Faizabad, refused to remove the idols, despite the State government’s direction.
Govind Ballabh Pant headed the Congress government in the United Provinces, now Uttar Pradesh. Jawaharlal Nehru was Prime Minister. This happened while Congress held power both at the Centre and in the province.
On 26 December 1949, Nehru sent Pant a telegram asking him to intervene personally. He warned that Ayodhya was setting a dangerous example.
By 5 March 1950, Nehru was openly critical in a private letter. He wrote that Pant had condemned the act but had not taken definite action, probably because he feared a large riot. Nehru also said some Congressmen had approved what had happened.
Nehru pressed for action, but the idols stayed. Pant condemned the installation without securing their removal, while some Congress leaders approved it.
Nehru’s telegram to Pant, 26 December 1949; Nehru’s letter, 5 March 1950.
Nehru named Congress leader Baba Raghavdas as someone who approved the act after it happened. He also wrote that other Congressmen approved it. This shows that support for the installation existed within Congress too. The government’s own ranks were divided over reversing the installation.
Nehru’s account of support within Congress, 5 March 1950.
K.K. Nayar—the district official who refused to remove the Ram Lalla idols despite the State government’s direction—later entered electoral politics. In 1967, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh fielded him in Bahraich, and he won the Lok Sabha seat. The official who had refused to reverse the unlawful installation was now an MP for Jana Sangh.
Jana Sangh’s record of K.K. Nayar’s election.
After the idols were installed in December 1949, officials restricted access and kept the gates to the inner courtyard locked. On 29 December, a magistrate ordered the property taken into official custody. A court-appointed caretaker took charge on 5 January 1950. Priests could enter to worship Ram Lalla. Ordinary Hindu visitors could view the idols through the barrier outside. Muslims could no longer enter their mosque to pray.
The result was unequal. Worship of the idols continued under restrictions. Muslims lost access to their mosque.
The Supreme Court later recognised their exclusion as unlawful. But the change made that night remained in place.
Judgment, paragraphs 719–722 Judgment, paragraphs 798–800
1949: who put the idols there, and how was the story told?
In Ayodhya: The Dark Night, Krishna Jha and Dhirendra K. Jha identify Abhiram Das as the leader of the group that put the idol inside the mosque.
The authors describe a wider political plan involving Hindu Mahasabha leaders. They also explain how a local weekly and later pamphlets promoted the story that Ram had appeared by a miracle. This is the book’s account of the planning and publicity.
Read the authorised book excerpt.
The court record gives another important detail. On 29 November 1949, the Superintendent of Police warned District Magistrate K.K. Nayar that people might force their way into the mosque to install idols. After the installation, Nayar refused the State government’s order to remove them.
The danger had been reported before it happened. The idols were then left inside. The warning and refusal are recorded in the Supreme Court judgment.
Supreme Court judgment, paragraph 719.
1950–1961: more cases followed
On 16 January 1950, Gopal Singh Visharad brought a case to protect Hindu worship. A temporary order, clarified on 19 January, prevented removal of the Ram Lalla idols and interference with their worship.
The court was protecting an arrangement created by the unlawful installation. The idols stayed and their worship continued; Muslims remained excluded from their mosque while ownership was still undecided.
Paramhans Ramchandra Das filed another worship case in December 1950. In 1959, Nirmohi Akhara sought management of the shrine. In 1961, the Sunni Central Waqf Board and Muslim residents sought recognition of the mosque and return of possession.
During these years, priests could still worship the idols under restricted arrangements. Muslims could not return to pray in the mosque.
Supreme Court judgment, paragraphs 13–20 and 426
1951–1980: from Jana Sangh to BJP
The Bharatiya Jana Sangh was founded in 1951 with RSS support. This was the party K.K. Nayar represented when he became an MP in 1967.
In 1977, Jana Sangh merged into the larger Janata Party. In 1980, former Jana Sangh leaders formed the BJP after the split. The RSS-linked political movement continued from Jana Sangh into the BJP, carrying forward Hindu nationalist politics. Janata Party was a broader alliance that also included other political traditions.
The BJP’s own account of its origins.
1984: the VHP built a temple campaign
In 1984, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, an RSS-linked organisation, took up the demand to “free” the claimed birthplace of Ram. Ashok Singhal was a key organiser.
This matters because the later confrontation did not grow only through court cases. Organisations built public support, held meetings and organised journeys around the temple demand.
Reporting on the VHP campaign and RSS connection.
1986: the gates opened during Congress rule
The gates had remained locked to ordinary visitors since the restrictions imposed after the 1949 idol installation. Priests continued worship inside, while Hindu visitors viewed the idols from outside the barrier. In January 1986, lawyer Umesh Chandra Pandey asked for the locks to be opened so devotees could enter for darshan—viewing the deity. On 1 February 1986, district judge K.M. Pandey allowed the request. Muslims were still not allowed to return to pray.
Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister and Vir Bahadur Singh headed the Congress government in Uttar Pradesh. Muslims asked to be heard before the judge decided whether to open the gates. But the judge ordered them opened without hearing their side. Legal scholar Ratna Kapur documents this procedural failure in her study of the case. The order widened access for Hindu worship while Muslims remained excluded. A decision changing access to their mosque was made without first hearing their objections. Kapur’s study, discussion of the 1986 unlocking.
Journalist Neerja Chowdhury’s book describes political involvement behind the unlocking. Drawing on an account from Arif Mohammed Khan, she writes that Rajiv approved the move through his minister Arun Nehru and the Chief Minister. Other recollections dispute Rajiv’s prior knowledge. These accounts disagree over Rajiv’s prior knowledge; the court order and the expansion of Hindu access are documented.
The opening widened Hindu access to the site. It did not restore Muslims’ access. It gave the temple campaign a major gain while Congress was in power.
Supreme Court judgment, paragraph 19; Neerja Chowdhury’s book excerpt; report on Wajahat Habibullah’s differing account.
June 1989: the BJP formally backed the temple demand
At its Palampur meeting in June 1989, the BJP formally adopted a resolution supporting the Ram temple demand. Its own party documents record this decision.
The campaign now had the open backing of a national political party. Advani’s 1990 Rath Yatra would carry that campaign further.
BJP document recording the Palampur resolution.
1989: a case was filed in Ram Lalla’s name
Ram Lalla means Ram in his child form.
On 1 July 1989, a new case was filed in Ram Lalla’s name. A retired judge, Deoki Nandan Agarwal, acted as the human representative. The legal name for this role is “next friend”.
How can a deity bring a case? Indian law allows a Hindu deity to hold property and take part in a case through a human representative. This is called being a “legal person”. It does not mean a statue spoke or signed papers.
The court accepted the case. Ram Lalla’s side eventually won the land.
Ram Lalla’s separate legal identity opened another route through the litigation. Earlier Hindu litigants had already brought worship and management cases. In 1989, Deoki Nandan Agarwal filed a new suit as the deity’s “next friend”—its human representative. The Court accepted that the deity’s interests were separate and inadequately protected by the earlier litigants. This allowed the new case to be considered on its own basis. The important issue is how that separate identity let the temple claim proceed despite the long history of earlier litigation. Judgment, paragraphs 425–429.
Could a new property case still be filed in 1989, decades after the dispute began? The law sets time limits for bringing cases. A case filed after the applicable limit can be dismissed as too late. For a human child, the law gives extra protection: if the right to sue arises while the person is a minor, the law can allow time to sue after adulthood. A representative can also bring the case while the person is still a child. A human child eventually becomes an adult. The special protection based on childhood then ends, and the person must sue within the time the law allows. It is extra time, not a lifelong exemption from deadlines.
Ram Lalla’s lawyers argued that the deity was a “perpetual minor”—legally always a child, who would never reach adulthood. They argued that time limits should therefore not bar its case. The Supreme Court rejected that exemption. But it did not dismiss Ram Lalla’s case as late. It accepted that the deity had not been a party to the earlier cases and that those cases were not adequately protecting its separate interests. On that basis, it held that the 1989 case was within time. Limitation Act, sections 6 and 8.
The court also rejected a separate claim that the birthplace land itself was a legal person.
Judgment, paragraphs 20 and 343–360 Judgment, paragraphs 192–205 and 425–429
1989: Rajiv Gandhi’s government allowed the foundation ceremony
On 9 November 1989, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad held a foundation-laying ceremony for the proposed temple. This ceremony is called shilanyas.
Rajiv Gandhi’s government allowed it to go ahead. Home Minister Buta Singh gave permission after meeting VHP leader Ashok Singhal, according to The Indian Express’s account.
This was another important step before the demolition. Permission from Rajiv Gandhi’s government helped the temple campaign move forward. The government had allowed another advance towards the temple campaign’s goal.
Reporting on the 1989 ceremony and government permission
1990–1992: the campaign grew, then the mosque was destroyed
25 September 1990: Advani launched the Rath Yatra. BJP president L.K. Advani began the journey at Somnath in Gujarat, intending to reach Ayodhya for kar seva on 30 October. Kar seva meant volunteer religious service; here it was linked to the demand to build a temple at the disputed site. The BJP’s own resolutions describe the yatra as a means of mobilising national support. BJP records.

23 October 1990: Bihar’s government arrested Advani. Chief Minister Lalu Prasad Yadav’s government stopped the Rath Yatra at Samastipur and arrested Advani. Lalu and Prime Minister V.P. Singh both belonged to Janata Dal, but headed different governments: Lalu governed Bihar; V.P. Singh headed the Central government, which depended on BJP support.

The BJP responded by withdrawing support from V.P. Singh’s government at the Centre. The arrest took place in Bihar, but the BJP’s response threatened the government in Delhi. Tensions had already grown over V.P. Singh’s implementation of OBC reservations under the Mandal Commission recommendations. Advani’s arrest was the immediate trigger for the withdrawal. Reporting from the day of the arrest; Parliamentary debate on Mandal and the withdrawal.

The temple campaign continued without Advani. On 30 October and 2 November, kar sevaks confronted security forces in Ayodhya; the mosque was attacked and police firing killed kar sevaks. Uttar Pradesh was then governed by Mulayam Singh Yadav. On 7 November 1990, V.P. Singh’s government lost its confidence vote and fell after the BJP withdrew support and his own party split. Chronology.
30 October 1990: Ram Lalla’s priest criticised the VHP’s campaign. In a filmed interview, Pujari Lal Das said the VHP was pursuing votes, money and power. He questioned why Babri Masjid should be demolished when Hindu worship was already taking place inside it, and criticised the violence surrounding the campaign. Filmmaker Anand Patwardhan’s account.
1991: the BJP gained control of Uttar Pradesh. Kalyan Singh became Chief Minister after the BJP won the State election. In October, his government acquired 2.77 acres around the disputed site, stating that the land was needed for pilgrim facilities. Courts restricted construction. On 2 November, Singh assured the National Integration Council that his government would protect the disputed structures and obey court orders. The Supreme Court recorded these assurances in its proceedings. Undertakings and land-acquisition orders.
July 1992: construction went ahead despite court restrictions. Kar sevaks carried out substantial concrete construction on the acquired land. Court proceedings examined the State government’s failure to prevent it. The activity stopped later that month, but the campaign continued. This breach matters: the courts were dealing with more than a hypothetical risk. In October 1994, the Supreme Court convicted Kalyan Singh of contempt for the July 1992 breach of his undertaking and sentenced him to one day’s imprisonment and a ₹2,000 fine. That was a separate conviction from the later demolition trial. Contempt judgment, 24 October 1994.
November 1992: the government promised that kar seva would remain symbolic. The temple campaign called supporters to Ayodhya for kar seva on 6 December. On 28 November, Kalyan Singh’s Uttar Pradesh government formally promised the Supreme Court that no construction material or machinery would enter the acquired land and that no construction would breach the High Court’s orders. The Court appointed a judicial observer to monitor compliance.
Supporters were gathering at the site, but the Court relied on the State government’s promise to keep the activity symbolic and prevent construction. Contemporary statement to Parliament; academic account of the Court’s order.
The plan below shows the mosque site, Ram Chabutra and the layers of security marked for 6 December 1992. These arrangements did not prevent the demolition.

6 December 1992: the mosque was unlawfully demolished. Kar sevaks broke through security, climbed the mosque and pulled it down. BJP leaders L.K. Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi and Uma Bharti were in Ayodhya; VHP and other movement leaders were also present. No court had authorised demolition. Court orders, State assurances and a judicial observer did not protect the mosque. The Liberhan Commission later attributed planned mobilisation and responsibility to RSS, VHP, BJP and associated leaders and criticised the Kalyan Singh government’s conduct. Reporting on the commission’s findings.
The Supreme Court later recognised that the demolition breached the order to preserve the existing situation and seriously violated the rule of law. The immediate historical result was irreversible: the mosque was gone. The property cases continued over the land where it had stood.
BJP’s account of mobilisation; Supreme Court judgment, paragraph 788.
1993: Lal Das was murdered after the demolition
Lal Das, the priest who had publicly criticised the VHP’s campaign, was removed from his post under Kalyan Singh’s BJP government in March 1992, before the demolition. In an interview with Manushi, he said the government had replaced him with a supporter of its own. Lal Das’s interview.
On 16 November 1993, almost a year after Babri Masjid was demolished, he was shot dead in Ranipur Chattar village near Ayodhya. His murder raised suspicions of political involvement; according to The Times of India, a CBI investigation attributed it to a land dispute. Report on his removal and murder.
2003: what did the digging show?
After the demolition, the courts investigated what lay beneath
After the mosque was demolished, the ownership cases continued over its ruins. The Hindu side argued that an earlier temple had stood underneath. The Allahabad High Court ordered an archaeological investigation into that claim.
After a ground-penetrating radar survey, the High Court ordered the Archaeological Survey of India to excavate on 5 March 2003. The ASI submitted its report on 22 August 2003. Judgment, paragraphs 26 and 493–494.
What the excavation established—and what it did not
The excavation found remains of an older building. The ASI interpreted them as being of Hindu religious origin. In its final judgment on 9 November 2019, the Supreme Court accepted that interpretation as more likely than not.
But identifying the building’s religion required interpretation. The judgment discussed individual objects compatible with Buddhist or Jain traditions. “Non-Islamic” does not automatically mean “Hindu”. The question is which features distinguished the building as Hindu and how convincingly the alternatives were ruled out.
The report did not identify a Ram temple or establish that a temple was demolished to build Babri Masjid. Even accepting the ASI’s interpretation, the excavation did not prove the campaign’s demolition story. Judgment, paragraphs 504 and 508–511.
Religious destruction was not confined to Muslim rulers
Religious conflict was not simply a story of Muslims attacking Hindus. Other rulers also attacked religious buildings, removed sacred images and took over religious property. Two examples show why this history cannot be reduced to a single conflict between two communities.
Kashmir, tenth century: a Buddhist monastery was destroyed and its materials reused for a Shiva temple. In his historical introduction to Gilgit Manuscripts, Buddhist scholar Nalinaksha Dutt recounts the destruction of Jayendra Vihara under King Kshemagupta, who ruled from about 950 to 958. Drawing on Kalhana’s Rajatarangini, Dutt says the king burned the monastery, took brass from its Buddha images and used its stones to build a Shiva temple. He also took over 32 villages belonging to the monastery. Dutt’s account, “Buddhism in Kashmir”, printed page 31.
Chidambaram, twelfth century: a Shiva-worshipping king removed a Vishnu image. During the reign of Chola king Kulottunga II, about 1133–1150, the Govindaraja image was removed from the Chidambaram temple complex, famous for its Nataraja shrine to Shiva. The king’s court poet Ottakkuttar described the removal in Kulottunga Cholan Ula. Scholar A. Srivathsan identifies the relevant verses in the study of Shaiva–Vaishnava conflict. A government gazetteer also records the removal during Kulottunga II’s reign. This was conflict within traditions now grouped together as Hinduism: devotion to Shiva did not always mean protection for a neighbouring Vishnu shrine. Study identifying the court poem and verses; government gazetteer’s account.
These examples challenge a one-sided account of religious destruction. They concern different events: burning a monastery and taking its property, and removing a sacred image from a temple complex. Each has its own sources and circumstances.
Why this matters to the judgment
The Supreme Court ultimately awarded the entire disputed site for a Ram temple. Yet the excavation had not established that a Ram temple was demolished to build the mosque.
The unlawful installation of idols in 1949 and destruction of the mosque in 1992 were documented facts. The judgment condemned those acts, but its outcome gave the temple campaign the site it demanded. That is the judicial failure at the heart of this history. Buried remains could not excuse the demolition or substitute for proof of ownership. Judgment, paragraphs 788 and 795–805.
November 2003: Muslims welcomed at Hanumangarhi
In November 2003, Hanumangarhi’s chief priest, Mahant Gyan Das, hosted hundreds of Muslims for iftar, the meal that breaks the Ramadan fast. A contemporary report also records Muslim prayers at the temple premises. A separate news report places the iftar on grounds adjoining the temple. This was another example of people making room for their neighbours’ faith. Contemporary report of iftar and namaz; IANS report preserved by Harvard’s Pluralism Project.
2010: the High Court divided the land—even though no party had asked for that division
Nirmohi Akhara is a Hindu religious order. In 1959, it filed a case seeking management and charge of the shrine where the Ram Lalla idols were being worshipped. It claimed the right to look after the shrine and conduct its religious services. It was not asking for one-third of the disputed land.
On 30 September 2010, the Allahabad High Court ordered the disputed site divided into three shares: one each for Ram Lalla, Nirmohi Akhara and the Muslim side.
But these cases had not asked the Court to divide jointly owned property into three shares. They concerned competing claims to ownership, worship and management.
The High Court dismissed Nirmohi Akhara’s case as filed too late. Yet the same judgment awarded it a one-third share of the property through its decision in Ram Lalla’s separate case—turning a management claim into an ownership award.
The High Court said the Muslim ownership case had been filed too late, yet still awarded the Muslim side a share. In 2019, the Supreme Court corrected the deadline finding: the Muslim case had been filed within time. It agreed, however, that Nirmohi Akhara’s separate management case was late.
The three-way split therefore needs scrutiny as a judicial decision, not merely description as a compromise. It awarded rights beyond the claims presented to the Court. The parties appealed, and the division never took effect. Supreme Court judgment: Nirmohi Akhara’s claim, paragraphs 52–54; rejection of the division, paragraphs 789–794.
2011–2019: the division was halted and the appeals continued
On 9 May 2011, the Supreme Court stayed the High Court’s ruling: it put the division on hold and ordered the existing arrangements maintained. The three-way division was never implemented.
During 2013–2017, the Court issued directions to obtain the case records and provide translations. The appeals remained pending.
On 8 March 2019, the Court appointed a mediation panel to seek an agreement between the parties. By August, there was no settlement resolving the dispute, so the Court proceeded with hearings.
The final hearings began on 6 August 2019 and ended on 16 October. Mediation continued alongside them. Some parties reached a conditional agreement, but others had not signed it. The Court therefore did not treat it as a binding settlement of the dispute. Judgment, paragraphs 29–32.
The three-way division never took effect. The Supreme Court would now decide who should get the disputed site.
2019: the Court condemned the unlawful acts—and awarded the site for a Ram temple

On 9 November 2019, five Supreme Court judges awarded the entire disputed site for a Ram temple, to be built through a government-created trust. Muslims were allotted five acres elsewhere for a mosque.
This was a property case. The Court had to establish who was legally entitled to the land. Religious belief and the right to worship did not, by themselves, establish ownership.
The Court considered the Hindu side’s evidence of worship and possession stronger. But it also recognised three crucial facts: Muslims had not abandoned the mosque; they had been unlawfully driven out in 1949; and the mosque had been unlawfully demolished in 1992.
The judgment condemned the unlawful acts, yet delivered the outcome the temple campaign had demanded: the entire site for a Ram temple. The campaign gained the disputed property. Those unlawfully excluded from the mosque were sent elsewhere.
Giving Muslims another plot did not reverse their exclusion or restore the mosque’s site. The Court used its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution to provide alternative land, but that remedy left the temple campaign with the place it had sought.
The Court’s condemnation and its remedy pulled in opposite directions. It recognised that people had taken the law into their own hands, while its final decision preserved the advantage created by their actions. Our criticism is that the judgment did not convincingly explain why the evidence entitled the temple side to the whole property—and why equal justice was satisfied by moving the displaced worshippers elsewhere. Judgment, paragraphs 788 and 795–805.
2019: why the Court’s reasoning deserves criticism
The Court said faith alone could not decide ownership. It therefore had to explain how the evidence established the temple side’s right to the entire disputed site. Our criticism is that its reasoning did not convincingly establish that link.
Rejecting the division did not establish ownership
The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s three-way division because it went beyond the claims presented. It also said dividing the small site would not secure lasting peace.
Neither reason, by itself, established that the temple side owned the whole property. That conclusion required separate evidence. A wish for peace could not replace proof of ownership. Judgment, paragraphs 791–794 and 799.
The treatment of worship and possession needs scrutiny
The Court pointed to missing proof that Muslims alone controlled the mosque’s inner area between its construction and 1857. It accepted earlier Hindu worship as more likely than not, relying partly on travellers’ accounts, including William Finch and Joseph Tieffenthaler.
The concern is how these findings justified awarding the whole site to the temple side. Evidence that Hindus worshipped at or around the site did not automatically establish ownership of every part of it. The mosque’s existence and evidence of Muslim prayer also had to be weighed. Missing evidence on one side could not, by itself, prove the other side’s ownership. Judgment, paragraphs 788 and 798.
Obstructing prayer should not create an advantage
The Court accepted that Muslims had prayed there, faced obstruction and had not abandoned the mosque. Yet it also considered repeated Hindu entries and challenges when assessing control of the site.
Being prevented from using a mosque is different from giving it up. Repeated interference shows that control was being challenged; it does not automatically show that those interfering owned the land. The judgment deserves criticism for allowing those challenges to weigh against the Muslim claim without convincingly explaining why they supported the competing right to the whole site.
Archaeology could not supply the missing proof
The Court acknowledged that the archaeological report had not established that a temple was demolished to build the mosque. An older structure could not, by itself, establish the temple side’s legal ownership centuries later. An alleged ancient wrong could not substitute for evidence deciding the property case. Judgment, paragraph 82 and paragraphs 509–511.
2019: the judgment did not identify its author
The five judges were Ranjan Gogoi, S.A. Bobde, D.Y. Chandrachud, Ashok Bhushan and S. Abdul Nazeer. Their identities were public and all five endorsed the decision. But the main judgment did not identify its author. A separate addendum on Hindu faith in the birthplace also did not identify which judge wrote it. In January 2024, Chandrachud said the bench had unanimously decided not to attribute authorship to an individual. Agreement on the result did not require withholding who wrote the reasoning. Readers should be able to examine responsibility for reasoning that determined the future of a demolished mosque. The absence of attribution adds an accountability concern to the substantive questions about unequal treatment. Chandrachud’s explanation, reported in January 2024; contemporary reporting on the main judgment and addendum.
The anonymity was a deliberate choice. In his memoir, Gogoi says that about a week before the hearings ended, he proposed that the author’s name should not be disclosed. Former Delhi High Court Chief Justice A.P. Shah criticised the resulting departure from judicial practice in February 2020. He also questioned why a separate, anonymous addendum reinforcing Hindu faith was needed after the bench had already agreed on the decision. If one judge wanted to add distinct reasons, why were those reasons not presented as an openly attributed concurring opinion? Readers were denied the usual attribution needed to examine individual judicial reasoning. Gogoi’s own account; A.P. Shah’s lecture, pages 12–13.
There was a later disclosure: at Ashok Bhushan’s retirement farewell in 2021, Supreme Court Bar Association president Vikas Singh identified him as the addendum’s author, according to Bar & Bench. That later identification does not change how the judgment was issued in 2019. The original omission of authorship obscured who supplied the additional reasoning. Report of the 2021 disclosure.
2020: the criminal case ended in acquittals
The Central Government set up the Liberhan Commission on 16 December 1992, ten days after the demolition. Justice M.S. Liberhan submitted its report on 30 June 2009, more than sixteen years later. The commission described planned mobilisation and assigned responsibility to senior movement leaders and the State administration.
On 30 September 2020, a special CBI court in Lucknow acquitted all 32 surviving accused, including L.K. Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi, Uma Bharti and Kalyan Singh. The judge held that the prosecution had not proved the alleged conspiracy and the accused persons’ responsibility to the required criminal standard.
The temple campaign had secured the site in 2019. In 2020, the separate demolition trial ended without a conviction. The criminal court’s conclusion conflicted with the commission’s account of planning and responsibility. The acquittals did not make the demolition lawful: a mosque had been destroyed in public, yet this trial held nobody criminally responsible. That was a disgraceful failure of accountability.
Government record of the commission’s establishment and report, MHA annual report 2009–10, paragraph 6.30; commission chronology; reporting on the acquittals.
Who were the 32 accused acquitted in 2020?
The following are the 32 surviving accused acquitted on 30 September 2020. The list follows contemporary reporting; English spellings vary across reports. Contemporary report listing all 32.
| No. | Name |
|---|---|
| 1 | Lal Krishna Advani |
| 2 | Murli Manohar Joshi |
| 3 | Kalyan Singh |
| 4 | Uma Bharti |
| 5 | Vinay Katiyar |
| 6 | Sadhvi Ritambhara |
| 7 | Mahant Nritya Gopal Das |
| 8 | Ram Vilas Vedanti |
| 9 | Champat Rai |
| 10 | Mahant Dharam Das |
| 11 | Satish Pradhan |
| 12 | Pawan Kumar Pandey |
| 13 | Lallu Singh |
| 14 | Prakash Sharma |
| 15 | Vijay Bahadur Singh |
| 16 | Santosh Dubey |
| 17 | Gandhi Yadav |
| 18 | Ramji Gupta |
| 19 | Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh |
| 20 | Kamlesh Tripathi |
| 21 | Ram Chandra Khatri |
| 22 | Jai Bhagwan Goel |
| 23 | Om Prakash Pandey |
| 24 | Amar Nath Goel |
| 25 | Jai Bhan Singh Pawaiya |
| 26 | Sakshi Maharaj (Maharaj Swami Sakshi) |
| 27 | Vinay Kumar Rai |
| 28 | Navin Bhai Shukla |
| 29 | R.N. Srivastava |
| 30 | Acharya Dharmendra Dev |
| 31 | Sudhir Kumar Kakkar |
| 32 | Dharmendra Singh Gurjar |
2024: the new temple was consecrated

On 22 January 2024, the new Ram Lalla idol was consecrated in the temple built at the site where Babri Masjid had stood. Official record of the ceremony.
A newly made idol was used. It was different from the older idol connected with the court case.
Report distinguishing the old and new idols
Who acted: people, organisations and evidence
| When | People and organisations | What they did | Evidence and its scope |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1855 | Shah Ghulam Hussein and his followers; Hanumangarhi’s Bairagis and other Hindu fighters; later Maulvi Amir Ali | Hussein’s followers attacked Hanumangarhi and retreated into Babri Masjid; Hindu fighters counterattacked there. Amir Ali later led another mobilisation, opposed by Wajid Ali Shah’s forces. | Historical reconstruction in Valay Singh’s account. These actors predate the RSS and BJP. |
| 1934 | Ayodhya Bairagis and Hindu attackers identified in a contemporary compensation application | The mosque’s domes were damaged. Officials arranged repairs and imposed a collective fine. | Judgment, paragraph 699, reproduces the application and administrative records. The compensation records identify Bairagis and Hindu attackers; they do not name an organising political party. |
| Before December 1949 | Bhaskar Das, a Ram Chabutra priest, and the mosque’s muezzin | Bhaskar Das recalled sleeping inside the mosque and moving his belongings during namaz. | A later recollection recorded in the Jhas’ book excerpt; evidence of everyday accommodation. |
| December 1949 | Abhiram Das (also recorded as Abhay Ram Das) and other members of the group; Hindu Mahasabha networks described by the Jhas; District Magistrate K.K. Nayar | Idols were carried inside the mosque. Nayar refused the State government’s direction to remove them. | The judgment records the FIR and official correspondence. The Jhas describe the wider planning and miracle publicity. The court record documents the installation and official response; the book examines the wider planning. |
| 1984 | VHP campaign organisers; Ram Janmabhoomi Mukti Yajna Samiti, with Dau Dayal Khanna as convenor and Mahant Avaidyanath as president | Committees, meetings and public mobilisation organised the temple demand. | The Liberhan Commission’s report, chapter VIII records the committee’s formation and officeholders. VHP belonged to the RSS-linked organisational movement. |
| 1989–1990 | BJP leadership and L.K. Advani | The BJP endorsed the temple demand at Palampur in June 1989. Advani’s Rath Yatra began on 25 September 1990. | BJP resolutions explicitly describe national mobilisation as the yatra’s purpose. |
| October 1990 | Pujari Lal Das, the court-appointed priest serving Ram Lalla | He criticised the VHP’s campaign in a filmed interview, showing opposition within Hindu religious life. | Anand Patwardhan’s firsthand account dates the interview to 30 October 1990. Lal Das was a different priest from Bhaskar Das. |
| 6 December 1992 | Kar sevaks; leaders and cadres of the RSS, VHP, BJP and associated organisations; Kalyan Singh’s Uttar Pradesh government | A mob demolished the mosque. The Liberhan Commission attributed planned mobilisation and responsibility to movement leaders and criticised the State government’s conduct. | Reporting on the commission and Liberhan’s account. Those inquiry findings differ from the separate criminal proceeding, which acquitted all 32 accused in 2020. |
| November 2003 | Hanumangarhi chief priest Gyan Das and Muslim participants | An iftar gathering and reported congregational namaz showed continued efforts at local cooperation. | Contemporary report; separate IANS report of the iftar on adjoining grounds. |
The court cases at a glance
This timeline separates a request, a temporary order and a final decision. Some cases lasted decades. The outcome column names the later decision where needed.
| When | Who asked for what? | What happened? |
|---|---|---|
| 1885–1886 | Mahant Raghubar Das asked to build over the platform outside the mosque. | The request and appeals failed. This was not a case granting the mosque for demolition. |
| 16 January 1950 | Gopal Singh Visharad sought Hindu worship rights. | A temporary order, clarified on 19 January, stopped removal of the idols and interference with worship. It preserved the situation created after the 1949 installation; it did not finally decide ownership. |
| 5 December 1950 | Paramhans Ramchandra Das filed a similar worship case. | He withdrew it in September 1990. Withdrawal was not a ruling awarding him the land. |
| 17 December 1959 | Nirmohi Akhara sought management and charge of the shrine. | In 2019, the Supreme Court dismissed its suit as filed too late. |
| 18 December 1961 | The Sunni Central Waqf Board and Muslim residents sought recognition of the mosque and return of possession. | In 2019, the Supreme Court held that their case was filed within time. But its final remedy gave them five acres elsewhere, not this site. |
| 1964 | The court combined the trial of the main pending suits. | The cases continued together. This was not a new decision about ownership. |
| 1 February 1986 | Umesh Chandra Pandey sought opening of the locks. | The district judge ordered wider Hindu access. This order concerned access for worship, not final ownership. |
| 1 July 1989 | Deoki Nandan Agarwal brought a case in the names of Ram Lalla and the claimed birthplace. | In 2019, the Court accepted the deity’s case and awarded the site for a temple. It rejected legal personhood for the land itself. |
| 30 September 2010 | The Allahabad High Court decided the joined property cases. | It ordered a three-way division. The Supreme Court later set that division aside. |
| 9 November 2019 | The Supreme Court decided the ownership appeals. | It awarded the entire disputed site for a Ram temple through a trust and ordered five acres elsewhere for a mosque. |
| 30 September 2020 | A separate criminal case concerned the demolition and alleged conspiracy. | All 32 accused were acquitted. This was a different case from the 2019 land judgment. |
Supreme Court judgment: case history, paragraphs 13–20; limitation findings, paragraphs 255 and 631; final directions, paragraph 805. Report of the separate 2020 criminal verdict.
Ayodhya conclusion: unlawful acts gained protection, and the campaign secured the site
Read each court decision separately, and the story can appear to be a series of technical questions. Follow the whole sequence, and a gradual takeover emerges.
In 1949, people secretly placed Ram Lalla idols inside a functioning mosque. Officials failed to remove them. Temporary court orders protected the idols and their worship, while Muslims remained excluded. The arrangement created by an unlawful act became the arrangement the courts preserved.
In 1986, the gates opened for wider Hindu access without first hearing the Muslim applicants seeking to join the proceedings. In 1989, a separate case in Ram Lalla’s name opened another legal route to claim the property. Alongside these proceedings, the VHP, BJP and RSS-linked movement organised an increasingly powerful political campaign.
Promises to protect the mosque failed. On 6 December 1992, a mob destroyed it. The ownership cases then continued over its ruins. Excavation found an older structure, but did not establish that a Ram temple had been demolished to build the mosque.
The 2010 High Court ruling introduced further errors, including awarding Nirmohi Akhara land when it had sought management of the shrine. The Supreme Court corrected those errors in 2019. But correcting the earlier judgment did not make its own final decision fair or its reasoning convincing.
The Supreme Court recognised the unlawful exclusion of Muslims and destruction of their mosque. Yet it awarded the entire disputed site for a Ram temple. The campaign secured the place it had demanded. Alternative land for a mosque did not undo that result. Judgment, paragraphs 788 and 795–805.
Then, in September 2020, the separate demolition trial acquitted all 32 surviving accused. The Liberhan Commission had described planned mobilisation and assigned responsibility to movement leaders. Nevertheless, that criminal trial ended without holding anyone guilty. Report on the commission and the acquittals.
This is the cumulative failure: an unlawful installation gained protection; exclusion continued; a mosque was destroyed; the temple campaign received the site; and the demolition trial produced no convictions. Condemning unlawful acts is not enough when the final outcome preserves the advantages they created.
That is why this history deserves strong criticism of the judiciary. Its responsibility was to uphold equal rights and the rule of law. Across these decades, its decisions failed to undo the exclusion—and ultimately delivered the disputed site for the very temple the campaign had demanded.
Thiruparankundram: an existing festival, a disputed addition

Thiruparankundram already had an annual Deepam ceremony at the Deepa Mandapam near Uchipillaiyar temple. The temple side told the court that this practice went back more than 150 years. In 2025, Rama Ravikumar requested lighting at another pillar near the dargah. The temple administration opposed the addition, citing its tradition and religious procedures. The demand concerned another location. The festival itself was continuing.
On 1 December 2025, Justice G.R. Swaminathan ordered lighting at the additional pillar as well.
The lamp was lit at its usual place on 3 December 2025 too. Claims that Hindus were stopped from lighting the festival lamp altogether are false. The BJP presented opposition to the additional location as an attack on Hindu interests, even though the temple itself opposed it. False claims spread through videos and forwarded messages. People share them without checking, turning a location dispute into a story that Hindus were stopped from celebrating. Report from the festival day.
Maruthaiyan’s criticism is simple: the temple already had a traditional place to light the lamp. Those demanding another location needed to prove their claim. Instead, the court asked the temple: why not light it there too? A court needs evidence and a clear legal basis before ordering an additional religious practice over the temple’s objection. On 6 January 2026, two High Court judges upheld the additional lighting order. Podcast discussion, around 1:39–1:43; judgment recording the competing arguments and reasons.
On 20 November 2026, the Supreme Court stayed the challenged High Court findings but allowed a restricted temple team to light the lamp at the disputed pillar on 24 November, for this year only. According to the report of the order, the permission would establish neither a custom nor a right to repeat it. Usual religious observances and the dargah’s activities must remain undisturbed. The ASI must set conditions to protect the monument; construction, permanent installations and damage are prohibited. The appeal remains undecided.
Why allow the disputed addition before deciding the right to demand it? The festival already has its usual lighting place. “One time only” still gives those seeking the change what they want this year. Report of the interim order.
Advocate Vanchinathan, discussing the November hearings, says the temple side warned that lighting could damage the disputed pillar. He also accuses the BJP of circulating a picture that wrongly places it between the dargah and the usual lighting site. A false picture can mislead readers about the whole dispute. Photograph discussion, 13:29–15:05; pillar-damage objection, 17:22–18:30.
The law should protect everyone equally. Courts must require evidence, hear everyone affected and apply the same standards. Their decisions deserve scrutiny, however senior the judges who make them.
Source note: This article draws on the Maruthaiyan–Deva podcast and Maruthaiyan’s January 2024 speech. The Thiruparankundram section also draws on advocate Vanchinathan’s press conference. Source links beside the sections let readers check the historical and legal claims.
Related: Thiruparankundram Deepam explained.
