
Babri Masjid was a mosque in Ayodhya. Muslims prayed there. Hindu worship also took place at a platform outside the mosque.
Over the years, the situation changed. Idols were secretly put inside. Muslims were kept out. Court orders protected the worship of those idols. A political campaign grew. Then a mob destroyed the mosque.
The Supreme Court recognised that Muslims had been unlawfully driven out and their mosque unlawfully demolished. Yet it awarded the entire disputed site for a Ram temple—the very outcome the temple campaign had demanded.
To understand the unfairness, follow what happened at each step.
1855–1885: the dispute reached Babri Masjid
In 1855, fighting began at nearby Hanumangarhi, a Hindu temple. Some Muslims claimed that a mosque there had been destroyed. After their attack failed, they retreated into Babri Masjid. Hindu fighters followed and attacked them there. Historical account.
British officials later put up a railing to separate worship areas and prevent more clashes. Muslims prayed inside the mosque; Hindus worshipped in the outer courtyard. Hindus then built Ram Chabutra, a raised platform outside the railing, to worship Ram. The mosque’s trustee, Mohd Asghar, later said it had been built in 1857 without permission.
In 1885, a Hindu religious leader asked to build a temple over the platform. The courts refused, fearing more fighting. Worship at the platform continued. At this stage, the request was to build outside the mosque. Court record, paragraphs 46 and 683–698.
1934–1949: conflict and cooperation both existed
A Hindu mob damaged the mosque in March 1934. British officials arranged repairs through a Muslim contractor. To recover the repair costs, they imposed a collective fine on Ayodhya’s Bairagis—Hindu religious ascetics—and Hindu residents. Muslims continued praying there. Court record, paragraphs 699–700.
But neighbours also helped one another. Bhaskar Das, a priest at Ram Chabutra, recalled sleeping inside the mosque. He moved his belongings when Muslims needed the space for prayers. People could follow their own faith while making room for others. His account.
December 1949: idols were carried inside
In December 1949, people secretly placed idols inside the mosque. Muslims were then prevented from entering to pray.
People were told that Ram Lalla—Ram in his child form—had appeared inside the mosque by a miracle. But people had carried the idols there. On the night of 22–23 December 1949, a group entered the mosque and placed them under its central dome.
The book Ayodhya: The Dark Night identifies Abhiram Das as the group’s leader. It describes Hindu Mahasabha leaders’ role in planning the act and spreading the miracle story. Book excerpt.
The State government ordered the idols removed. District Magistrate K.K. Nayar refused. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru also pressed for action, but the idols were not removed. Meanwhile, some Congress leaders supported their installation. The idols stayed. Muslims were kept out. The use of the mosque had changed before a court decided who owned the land. Official record, paragraph 719; Nehru’s letter.
1950: court orders kept that change in place
The next question was whether the idols would stay.
After the December 1949 installation, officials took control and restricted entry with locked gates, citing the danger of conflict. Priests could enter to worship the idols. Other Hindu devotees viewed them from outside. Muslims could no longer enter to pray.
In 1950, temporary court orders prevented the idols’ removal and protected their worship.
Ownership was still undecided. But the court orders protected the arrangement created by the unlawful installation. Muslims did not get their earlier access back. What began with people carrying idols inside now continued under court protection. Court record, paragraphs 12–19 and 719.
1984–1986: the campaign asked for more, and access widened
This unequal arrangement continued for decades: worship of the idols continued, while Muslims remained excluded.
In 1984, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), an RSS-linked Hindu nationalist group, built a campaign for a Ram temple at the site. Campaign history.
The campaign now demanded that Hindu devotees be allowed past the locked gates. In January 1986, a lawyer named Umesh Chandra Pandey asked the court to open them so devotees could enter for darshan—viewing the idols.
On 1 February 1986, District Judge K.M. Pandey granted that request. Muslim applicants had asked to join the proceedings, but were not heard before the order. The gates opened for Hindu devotees, while Muslims remained barred from prayer.
The court widened Hindu access without first hearing the Muslim applicants. Muslims stayed out. The decision changed access before ownership was settled. Congress governed both India and Uttar Pradesh. Court record, paragraph 19; study of the denied hearing.
1989–1990: a new case joined a growing political campaign
In June 1989, the BJP formally backed the temple demand. The following month, retired judge Deoki Nandan Agarwal filed a new case in Ram Lalla’s name, acting as the deity’s human representative.
The law recognised Ram Lalla as a legal person who could hold property and bring a case through a human representative. In 2019, the Supreme Court allowed this case, saying earlier cases had not properly protected the deity’s interests. The temple demand gained a separate legal route while Muslims remained excluded.
The claimants also argued that Ram Lalla was always legally a child, so filing deadlines should not apply. The Court rejected that argument, but allowed the case for other reasons. BJP records; judgment, paragraphs 425–429.
On 25 September 1990, BJP leader L.K. Advani began his Rath Yatra—a journey to build support for the temple. His arrest in October did not stop supporters reaching Ayodhya. The mosque was attacked. Police firing killed kar sevaks, or volunteers. The campaign increased pressure while the land cases continued. Timeline.
Pujari Lal Das, the priest serving Ram Lalla, opposed the campaign. In a filmed interview on 30 October 1990, he accused the VHP of using religion for votes, money and power. The idols were already worshipped inside: why destroy the building? He warned that political leaders were stirring up deadly Hindu–Muslim conflict. Lal Das’s interview, reproduced by filmmaker Anand Patwardhan.
1991–1992: promises failed to protect the mosque
The BJP took power in Uttar Pradesh in 1991. Chief Minister Kalyan Singh promised to protect the mosque. In July 1992, construction near the mosque went ahead despite court restrictions. In November, his government again promised to obey the restrictions.
On 6 December 1992, a mob demolished Babri Masjid. No court had allowed its destruction. An earlier breach had already shown the danger. Court orders and further promises still failed to save the building. Court record; account of the November order.
Ten days later, on 16 December, the Government set up the Liberhan Commission to investigate. The building was gone, but the land cases continued.
2003–2010: the courts examined what had stood underneath
In March 2003, the High Court ordered digging to investigate the earlier-temple claim. The Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) found remains of an older building. It interpreted them as a Hindu religious structure. The Supreme Court accepted that interpretation in 2019.
How firmly did those remains establish the building’s religion? The judgment acknowledged that some objects could also fit Buddhist or Jain traditions. Calling objects “non-Islamic” does not, by itself, identify them as Hindu.
The report did not identify a Ram temple or establish that a temple was demolished to build the mosque. Even accepting ASI’s interpretation, the excavation did not prove the campaign’s demolition story. Judgment, paragraphs 504 and 508–511.
Religious destruction was not confined to Muslim rulers. Buddhist establishments suffered under Hindu rulers, and conflicts occurred between followers of Shiva and Vishnu. This challenges a one-sided history. But examples elsewhere cannot establish what happened beneath Babri Masjid. Buddhist monastery account; Chidambaram’s Vishnu shrine, page 153.
Local efforts at peace also continued. In November 2003, Hanumangarhi priest Gyan Das welcomed Muslims for iftar, the meal ending the daily Ramadan fast. A report also records Muslim prayers at the temple premises. Contemporary report; separate report of the iftar on adjoining grounds.
On 30 June 2009, the Liberhan Commission submitted its report. It described planned mobilisation and held RSS, VHP, BJP and other leaders responsible. Commission dates; findings.
In 2010, the Allahabad High Court divided the land into three shares. The dispute then reached the Supreme Court on appeal.
2019: the Court condemned the wrongs, but gave the site for a temple
On 9 November 2019, the Supreme Court gave the disputed site for a temple. It ordered five acres elsewhere for a mosque.
To decide who should get the land, it relied partly on travellers’ accounts of early Hindu worship. It also pointed to missing proof that Muslims alone controlled the mosque before 1857.
Here is the problem in everyday words. People praying at a place does not automatically make them its owners. And stopping people from using their mosque does not mean they gave it up. The Court itself accepted that Muslims had prayed there, faced obstruction and had not abandoned it.
Yet Muslims did not recover the site. Our criticism is that the judgment did not convincingly explain why the evidence of Hindu worship entitled the temple side to the whole disputed property. Nor did its remedy return the place Muslims had unlawfully lost. Judgment, paragraphs 788 and 795–805.
The five judges were named, but the judgment did not identify its author. A separate opinion on Hindu faith also had no author’s name. Former Delhi High Court Chief Justice A.P. Shah criticised this unusual secrecy. Judges should be accountable for the reasons they write. Gogoi’s account; Shah’s lecture, pages 12–13.
2020–2024: acquittals, then the new temple
In September 2020, a criminal court acquitted all 32 surviving accused in the demolition case. This conflicted with the Liberhan Commission’s account of planning and responsibility. The acquittals did not make the demolition lawful. Reporting; all 32 names.
The new temple was consecrated at the site in January 2024. Report.
Ayodhya conclusion: a gradual takeover, one step at a time
Read one court order alone, and it may look like a small decision about worship or access. Follow the whole history, and a gradual takeover emerges. Unlawfully installed idols stayed under court protection. Hindu access widened while Muslims stayed out. A mob demolished the mosque. The Supreme Court then awarded the site for a Ram temple.
The courts condemned unlawful acts but did not undo the advantage those acts created. Muslims never regained their mosque. The temple campaign secured the site it demanded. That is the judicial failure this article challenges.
The result became even more troubling in September 2020. A separate criminal court acquitted all 32 surviving accused, including L.K. Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi and Uma Bharti, saying the charges were not proved. The temple campaign had secured the site; the demolition trial ended without a conviction.
A mosque was unlawfully destroyed in public, yet that trial held nobody criminally responsible. This was a disgraceful failure of accountability. It gives people powerful reason to question whether the justice system protected Muslims’ rights equally. Report on the acquittals.
Thiruparankundram: an existing festival, a disputed addition

Thiruparankundram already had an annual Deepam ceremony at the Deepa Mandapam near Uchipillaiyar temple. The temple side told the court that this practice went back more than 150 years. In 2025, Rama Ravikumar requested lighting at another pillar near the dargah. The temple administration opposed the addition, citing its tradition and religious procedures. The demand concerned another location. The festival itself was continuing.
On 1 December 2025, Justice G.R. Swaminathan ordered lighting at the additional pillar as well.
The lamp was lit at its usual place on 3 December 2025 too. Claims that Hindus were stopped from lighting the festival lamp altogether are false. The BJP presented opposition to the additional location as an attack on Hindu interests, even though the temple itself opposed it. False claims spread through videos and forwarded messages. People share them without checking, turning a location dispute into a story that Hindus were stopped from celebrating. Report from the festival day.
Maruthaiyan’s criticism is simple: the temple already had a traditional place to light the lamp. Those demanding another location needed to prove their claim. Instead, the court asked the temple: why not light it there too? A court needs evidence and a clear legal basis before ordering an additional religious practice over the temple’s objection. On 6 January 2026, two High Court judges upheld the additional lighting order. Podcast discussion, around 1:39–1:43; judgment recording the competing arguments and reasons.
On 20 November 2026, the Supreme Court stayed the challenged High Court findings but allowed a restricted temple team to light the lamp at the disputed pillar on 24 November, for this year only. It said the permission would establish neither a custom nor a right to repeat it. The appeal remains undecided.
Why allow the disputed addition before deciding the right to demand it? The festival already has its usual lighting place. “One time only” still gives those seeking the change what they want this year. Report of the interim order.
Advocate Vanchinathan, discussing the November hearings, says the temple side warned that lighting could damage the disputed pillar. He also accuses the BJP of circulating a picture that wrongly places it between the dargah and the usual lighting site. A false picture can mislead readers about the whole dispute. Photograph discussion, 13:29–15:05; pillar-damage objection, 17:22–18:30.
The law should protect everyone equally. Courts must require evidence, hear everyone affected and apply the same standards. Their decisions deserve scrutiny, however senior the judges who make them.
This article draws on the Maruthaiyan–Deva podcast, checked against the linked historical and legal sources.
Read the detailed account: Ayodhya: how a mosque became the site of the Ram temple.
